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Abstract
Even in the absence of an explicit regional policy, countries redistribute substantial amounts
of wealth between regions through taxation and social security. Using data on 140 European
regions between 1995 and 2007, this paper finds that interregional income redistribution
leads to lower regional economic growth and to slower within-country convergence. This
may explain the observed lack of within-country convergence in the EU, in contrast to
relatively fast between-country convergence where such redistributive schemes do not exist.
The results suggest that investment in transport infrastructure or human capital offer better
means to foster both regional growth and convergence.
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1. Introduction
There exist many ways in which income is redistributed between regions with different
income levels. Many federal states have set up rules with the explicit aim to equalise wealth
between regions. But even in a country without an explicit regional policy, the existence of
regional income inequality and progressive taxes in combination with an equal provision of
public goods across regions de facto implies interregional redistribution.
Redistribution between countries is limited compared to within-country redistribution.
The amount of between-country redistribution in the EU is necessarily small since the
EU budget is currently capped at 1.24 percent of GNI. Gordon (1991) estimates that EU
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transfers lead to a 3 percent reduction of the initial difference in member state per capita
income. Dome´nech et al. (2000) obtain 5 percent with more recent data. These numbers
are dwarfed by within-country redistribution operating through taxation and social security.
Me´litz and Zumer (2002), for example, estimate a 26 percent reduction of regional income
inequality in the UK and a 38 percent reduction for France.1 The median euro-area country
in our sample2 compensates about 34 percent of interregional differences in primary income.
Given the substantial size of both the interregional income differentials and the amount of
redistributed wealth, the question on the effect of interregional redistribution and especially
the effect on regional growth and convergence is important. Can redistribution help poorer
regions to catch-up, or does it merely work redistributive without structurally changing the
growth path of the poorer region? Or worse: does it distort incentives to an extent which
prevents a potential catch-up from taking place?
Empirically, poorer regions in Europe show higher average growth rates such that
convergence might be reasonably expected. In contrast, regional convergence within
individual EU member states seems to have slowed down in recent decades. The European
Commission (1999) reports that between 1986 and 1996 regional disparities decreased
only in the UK and Portugal, and more recent figures confirm this trend (see for example
Armstrong and Vickerman, 1995; Canova and Marcet, 1995; de La Fuente and Vives, 1995;
Overman and Puga, 2002; Magrini, 2004).
There obviously exist many differences between regions within a single country on the
one hand and regions in different countries on the other hand which might explain these
different growth paths. Migration and trade, for example, are known to be more intensive
within countries. Legislation such as labour market regulation is more homogeneous within
countries. Models of economic geography predict that higher within-country factor mobility
indeed may lead to regional divergence. In many neo-classical economic growth models,
however, factor mobility and trade drives economic convergence, and therefore these facts
would only add to the puzzle on why the observed within-country convergence rates are
lower, rather than offering a possible explanation.
Both neoclassical theories and models of economic geography predict that redistribution
affects regional growth and convergence through its effect on regional income and incentives
for factor mobility. This paper introduces a neoclassical model which explicitly considers
1Also see von Hagen (2000) for other estimates of interregional redistribution in a variety of countries.
2Our sample consists of the eurozone countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal.
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the effects of interregional redistribution on convergence. The main contribution of this
paper is empirical, however.
We investigate the effect of redistribution on growth and convergence using Eurostat
data from 1995 to 2007 on 140 NUTS-2 regions in 9 euro-area countries. The dataset
contains observations on various regional characteristics, primary and disposable household
income, and information on the size of household transfers through taxation and social
security. This allows to calculate the extent of within-country interregional redistribution as
well as the speed of interregional convergence and regional growth. There exist substantial
differences between regions in terms of the level and growth of regional income, and also
with respect to the extent of within-country redistribution in the different countries and
changes therein over time. This variation allows to identify the effect of redistribution on
regional convergence and growth.
Our empirical results indicate that the lack of within-country convergence can to a large
extent be attributed to the existence of distorting within-country interregional redistribution.
Moreover, it is found that redistribution lowers regional growth. A typical redistributive
scheme therefore decreases current inequality in disposable income between regions, but this
comes at the double cost of lower growth on the country-level and relatively lower growth
in backward regions. This latter effect may be as large as to cause regional divergence and
therefore larger future regional income differences.
In related work Checherita et al. (2009) consider the link between redistribution, labour
mobility and regional growth. Our approach differs from their contribution in some
important respects, however. Our estimation equation is derived directly from a small
neo-classical growth model and allows to derive a point estimate of how much redistribution
affects growth and convergence. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows to
control for time invariant country and regional characteristics. Possible endogeneity of
redistribution is controlled for by measuring the amount of redistribution on the country
level while estimating the growth impact on the regional level, and -as a robustness check- by
instrumenting the redistribution measure using the Arellano-Bond system GMM approach
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).
The main innovation of our paper lies with introducing theory on the measurement
of redistribution (Bayoumi and Masson, 1995; Me´litz and Zumer, 2002) in a standard
β-convergence framework (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992; Blanchard,
1991) and using these insights to reconsider the effect of redistribution on growth an
convergence. Although the the estimation equation follows from theory, the empirical
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results can also be interpreted quite independently: β-convergence occurs when initially
poorer regions have higher growth rates. If any variable affects the rate of β-convergence
between regions, it should therefore change this relationship between the initial level of
income and regional growth. To our knowledge our paper is the first to consider the effect
of a variable on convergence through this interaction effect.
The remainder of this paper consists of three sections. Section 2 briefly discusses
some existing theories on interregional transfers and convergence, and introduces a small
neoclassical regional growth model with interregional redistribution. Section 3 introduces
the datasets, derives a measure of redistribution and describes the relationship between
interregional redistribution and within-country disparity in a σ-convergence framework.
Section 4 shows how income redistribution and other factors affect regional growth and
convergence by means of a β-convergence analysis. A final section summarises the results
and concludes.
2. Theory on regional disparities and public policy
2.1. Selected literature overview
Apt regional policies may be expected to foster regional convergence. In the neoclassical
growth model of Dome´nech et al. (2000), for example, interregional transfers increase the
growth level of the backward region by directly increasing its productive capital stock. In the
hybrid endogenous growth model of Puigcerver-Pen˜alver (2007) public policy affects the rate
of technological progress and growth in backward regions. Given the mechanisms underlying
growth in these models it is unsurprising that a government can promote convergence
through specific policy measures. More disconcerting is the fact that some policy measures
which might intuitively be expected to help poorer regions may actually adversely affect
their growth rates. The following paragraphs offer some examples from the literature.
A significant part of European regional funds is invested in transport infrastructure.
Models of economic geography, such as Martin and Rogers (1995); Puga (2002); Behrens
et al. (2007), however, show that transport infrastructure works in a country may increase
regional inequality when a sufficiently large asymmetry in market potential between the
regions causes firms to relocate from the poorer to the richer region after transport costs
decline. Only if transport costs within the backward region itself decline by more than the
transport costs between regions, a backward region may benefit from transport infrastructure
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investment.3
Dupont and Martin (2006) use a small general equilibrium model with two regions
and mobile firms to show that various subsidy schemes in the poorer region which are
financed on the national level, such as tax-breaks or production subsidies, may actually
increase interregional inequality and even decrease welfare in the poorer region. When
capital is mobile, these subsidies eventually only benefit capital owners, irrespective of
their location. When more capital owners live in the richer region this policy will increase
regional inequality.
In a very different setting with constant returns to scale and perfectly mobile labour and
capital Padovano (2007) derives similar results. In his model productive factors relocate to
the region with the highest return, which leads to income convergence. Progressive taxation
of factor income reduces interregional factor return differentials. This slows the relocation
of factors of production and leads to slower convergence.
These examples make clear that the predicted effects of interregional transfers on
convergence depend heavily on the nature of those transfers. Transfers which are purely
redistributive are mostly predicted to distort incentives, growth and convergence. Transfers
which are able to increase the productivity in the backward region are predicted to foster
growth and convergence. The predictions on the effect of infrastructure investment are
very different when comparing models of economic geography and neoclassical models
of economic growth. In this light, we will take care in controlling for variables such as
transport infrastructure and proxies for human capital investment when modelling regional
growth in the empirical section.
To illustrate how redistributive transfers may negatively affect convergence, the next
section introduces a small neo-classical regional growth model. The regional growth equation
derived from the model will be used as the estimation equation in the empirical section.
The model is based on Blanchard (1991) and Padovano (2007).
2.2. A model on the effect of redistribution on factor mobility and convergence
Consider a world economy consisting of regions indexed by i which belong to countries
indexed by n. Time is indexed by t. All regions are assumed to be identical, apart from
a difference in the level of capital knit and labour lnit. All variables are measured in logs.
3As argued by Ago et al. (2006) and Behrens (2004), however, a backward region may benefit from
lower country-wide transport costs depending on its location (for example when the backward region is
located in between two wealthier regions).
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The world-wide amount of labour and capital is assumed to be fixed. With a a technology
parameter and θnit an idiosyncratic shock, the difference between regional production qnit
and the geometric average of production in all regions in country n, qnt, is given by
qnit − qnt = a(lnit − lnt) + (1− a)(knit − knt) + θnit.
The inverse relative demand for the regional specific output in region i is
pnit − pnt = −d(qnit − qnt) + nit,
with nit an idiosyncratic demand shock, and d > 0 a parameter governing the price
sensitivity of demand. The shocks to regional production and demand θnit and nit are
allowed to be non-stationary.
Before government intervention, both capital and labour earn the value of their marginal
products such that wnit = pnit +a+ qnit− lnit and rnit = pnit + (1−a) + qnit−knit. Regional
output per capita equals income per capita and is given by ynit = pnit+ qnit− lnit. Therefore
wnit−wnt = ynit− ynt: the relative regional wage equals relative regional income per capita.
Government intervention drives a wig between primary income and disposable income.
With ydnit − ydnt the relative regional disposable income per capita after government inter-
vention, define the ‘regional rate of redistribution’ ρ′nit as
ρ′nit = 1−
ydnit − ydnt
ynit − ynt (1a)
and therefore
ydnit − ydnt = (1− ρ′nit)(ynit − ynt) (1b)
such that ρ′nit < 0 when the initial relative income position of region i is magnified by
government intervention in country n; ρ′nit = 0 if the relative income position of the region
is unaffected by policy; 0 < ρ′nit ≤ 1 is indicative of a redistributive policy reducing the
initial regional income difference and ρ′nit = 1 implies a complete removal thereof. The case
ρ′nit > 1 corresponds to a policy which overcompensates the initial income difference of
region i relative to the country average. For now, we consider only the empirically most
relevant case where 0 ≤ ρ′nit ≤ 1.
Assume that labour is internationally immobile (lnt = ln,t−1), but relocates within
countries to regions with relatively high disposable income according to the following law
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of motion:
lni,t+1 − ln,t+1 = lnit − lnt + bn(ydnit − ydnt),
where ydnit denotes the log of disposable regional income -income after all government
transfers- and ydnt is its geometric average over all regions within country n in year t. bn is
the speed of within-country migration in response to regional income differentials. This
parameter is allowed to differ between countries.
This allows to write the labour mobility equation as a function of primary regional income,
the regional measure of redistribution ρ′nit, and the speed of within-country migration bn:
lni,t+1 − ln,t+1 = lnit − lt + bn(1− ρ′nit)(ynit − ynt).
Recursively using the above results then allows to derive the time-series behaviour of
regional total income per capita ynit = qnit + pnit − lnit relative to the country average:
ynit − ynt = (yni,t−1 − yn,t−1)− βni,t−1(yni,t−1 − yn,t−1) + znit,
where
βnit = bn(1− ρ′nit)[1− (1− a)(1− d)],
znit = [(1− d)θnit + nit]− [(1− d)θni,t−1 + ni,t−1].
The growth rate of the regional income per capita therefore is given by
ynit − yni,t−1 = (ynt − yn,t−1)− βni,t−1(yni,t−1 − yn,t−1) + znit,
which is the standard β-convergence estimation equation, augmented by an effect of income
redistribution on convergence. More redistribution (a higher ρ′ni,t−1) implies slower within-
country convergence (a smaller βni,t−1) towards the country-year average income level.
Redistribution slows convergence by reducing differences in disposable income and thus
discouraging convergence enhancing labour relocation. Note that the original error terms
enter in first differences, such that the growth equation can be consistently estimated even
in the presence of persistent production and demand shocks.4
Since the relative return to factors of production is key to migration and investment
decisions, it is the extent to which transfers affect these relative regional factor prices which
4This will no longer hold in the case of regional differences in capital endowment and capital mobility.
See Blanchard (1991) for details.
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matters for convergence in this framework, rather than the absolute amounts transferred.
This focus on relative regional factor prices is an important difference between our approach
and other recent studies investigating the link between transfers and convergence such as
Kessler and Lessmann (2008) and Checherita et al. (2009).
Up to this point, only within-country labour mobility was considered. Within-country
labour mobility gave rise to within-country convergence of regional income. Introducing
between-country labour mobility will similarly lead to between-country convergence. Assume
now that labour relocates as a function of both within-country and between-country
differences in disposable income, according to the following law of motion:
lni,t+1 − lt+1 = lnit − lt + b1n(ydnit − ydnt) + b2(ydnt − ydt ),
where the geometric average of a variable over all regions in all countries is indexed by
t. Factor mobility is known to be much higher within countries, which would imply that
b1n > b2 for all countries n. Moreover, income redistribution operates almost exclusively
within countries through the fiscal system and social security, diminishing the difference of
regional income relative to the country-level average rather than between countries, and
therefore
lni,t+1 − lt+1 = lnit − lt + b1n(1− ρ′nit)(ynit − ynt) + b2(ynt − yt).
Express the regional production and demand relative to the geometric average over all
countries:
qnit − qt = a(lnit − lt) + (1− a)(knit − kt) + θnit
pnit − pt = −d(qnit − qt) + nit.
Following the same reasoning as above then allows to derive the expression for regional
growth:
ynit − yni,t−1 = (yt − yt−1)− β1ni,t−1(yni,t−1 − yn,t−1)− β2(yn,t−1 − yt−1) + znit, (2)
where
β1nit = b1n(1− ρ′nit)((1− a(1− d))
β2 = b2((1− a(1− d)).
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The coefficient β1ni,t−1 > 0 reflects the speed of within-country convergence. Changes in b1n
or ρni,t−1 imply changes in β1ni,t−1. The coefficient β2 reflects the speed of between-country
convergence, expressing how regional growth changes with the relative income position
of the country the region i belongs to. Excluding international income redistribution
and imposing an equal speed of international labour mobility b2 in all countries implies a
constant speed of between-country convergence β2.
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In the absence of redistribution (ρ′nit = 0) and if interregional and international labour
mobility are equally fast (b1n = b2), the speed of within-country convergence and between-
country convergence is equal (β1nit = β2). All regions then converge equally fast towards
the average income over all regions yt. Higher levels of within-country income redistribution
ρ′nit tend to slow within-country regional convergence but this does not affect the speed of
between-country convergence. In the absence of within-country redistribution (ρ′nit = 0), and
if within-country labour mobility is faster than between-country labour mobility between
(b1n > b2), the speed of within-country convergence will exceed between-country convergence
(β1nit > β2).
In the presence of redistribution (ρ′nit > 0) and if interregional and international labour
mobility are equally fast (b1n = b2), within-country convergence will be less than between-
country convergence (β1nit < β2). But if within-country labour mobility is sufficiently fast
compared to between-country labour mobility (b1n  b2), within-country convergence may
still exceed the speed of between-country convergence (β1nit > β2) despite the presence of
some redistribution.
3. Measuring interregional redistribution and inequality
Before turning to the estimation of growth regression such as equation (2), this section
first describes the data, the measurement of redistribution, and analyses the relationship
between redistribution and within-country inequality in the data.
3.1. Data description
The analysis uses publicly available Eurostat data on 140 NUTS-2 level regions in 9
euro-area countries for the years 1995-2007.
The European Union provides an interesting case to study the evolution of regional
inequality and the effect of redistribution. There are no legal limits to international labour
5Allowing b2 and β2 to differ between countries does not add much insight. It also does not change the
main empirical results.
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and capital mobility between EU member states, an important condition for regional
convergence in the neoclassical framework presented in the previous section. Income
differences are significant, both within and between member states. Redistributive schemes
are significant in size, but large differences exist both between member states and over time.
To consider only comparable economies and avoid issues due to large exchange rate
fluctuations the sample is limited to euro-area countries. Ireland consists of only two
regions at the NUTS-2 level. Slovenia and Luxembourg consist of one single NUTS-2 region.
This does not suffice to (reliably) calculate interregional redistribution. Greece had to be
excluded on basis of data reliability.6 This limits our sample to Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Spain, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal.7
The empirical results are robust to excluding any of these 9 countries from the sample, or
including Greece and Ireland despite the data issues and limited number of observations for
these countries. The results are also valid for a wider sample including the UK, Sweden and
Poland which are the non euro-area countries for which sufficient regional data is available.
We limit the analysis to the larger euro-area countries, however, in order to consider
relatively homogeneous economies with sufficient observations and to avoid problems with
exchange rate fluctuations.
To allow for cross-sectional comparison, monetary variables were ppp-corrected using
1995 ppp-indices for all years. These variables were subsequently deflated using the country-
wide consumer price index.
3.2. Measuring interregional redistribution
Measuring redistribution on the regional level using equation (1a) poses several problems.
First, from a numerical perspective, the division by a value which may lie arbitrarily close
to zero leads to erratic results.8 This makes the ρ′nit most variable for those (many) regions
6There is a break in the Greek series in the year 2000. This is unfortunate since Greece is an interesting
case for the study of redistribution: it is the only country in the sample with a redistributive scheme which
enlarges existing income differences.
7Of these 9 countries, the following overseas regions were excluded: ES63, ES64, ES53 (Ceuta, Melilla
and the Balearic Islands for Spain); FR91, FR92, FR93, FR94 (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane and
Reunion for France); PT20, PT30 (the Azores Archipelago and Madeira for Portugal).
8Say region i has a primary income level which is 0.5 percent below the country average. With
ynit− ynt = −0.005, ρ′nit will take on the values 1.5,0.5 or -1.5 for values of ydit− ydt equal to -0.0075,-0.0025
and 0.0075 respectively; for ynit− ynt = −0.0025 this becomes -3, -1 and 3. This shows how a minor change
in the relative position of a region may greatly affect the measure ρ′it if ynit − ynt is small. In our dataset
the estimated ρ′nit range from -1238 (The Cantabria region in Spain, 2007) to 67 (The Umbria region in
Italy, 2001). Most regions have values of ρ′nit which are well behaved, however. The 25 and 75 percentiles
of the distribution of ρ′nit are 0.16 and 0.47 respectively.
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with initial income levels relatively close to the country average, where redistributive policies
are likely to matter less. One solution might be to set ρ′nit = 0 (no income redistribution) if
ynit − ynt and ydnit − ydnt are both small, but this is arbitrary, causes loss of information and
introduces some bias. Second, from an empirical perspective, ρ′nit might be endogenous in a
regression of regional income growth since it is measured on the regional level and depends
directly on regional income. Third, the dependency of ρ′nit on regional income may lead
to multi-colinearity issues given that regional income is often a key regressor in empirical
regional growth analysis.
To avoid these problems associated with regionally estimated measures of redistribution
ρ′nit, a measure of redistribution ρnt can be defined at the country level as
E
[
ydnit − ydnt
∣∣ ynit − ynt] = (1− ρnt) [ynit − ynt] . (3)
Estimating ρnt amounts to running a regression of y
d
nit − ydnt on ynit − ynt separately for
every country and year in the sample. A constant term is not required because the average
deviation of regional income from the country average is zero. The coefficient on ynit − ynt
then corresponds to 1−ρnt. It expresses how much of a relative regional difference in primary
income is translated into a relative regional difference in secondary income, on average
between all regions within a certain country and year. The parameter ρnt again is a ‘rate of
redistribution’, expressing the share of the relative regional difference in primary income
which is removed by government intervention. Measures of within-country redistribution
closely related to the measure based on equation (3) have been introduced and estimated in
different forms by, for example, Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Me´litz and Zumer (2002).
Note that the country-level measure of redistribution ρnt can straightforwardly replace
the regional rate of redistribution ρ′nit defined in equation (1a) in the model of section 2.
With redistribution defined on the country level the following regional growth equation
replaces equation (2)
ynit − yni,t−1 = yt − yt−1 − β1n,t−1(yni,t−1 − yn,t−1)− β2(yn,t−1 − yt−1) + znit, (4)
where β1n,t−1 = b1n(1 − ρn,t−1)((1 − a(1 − d)). Using a country-year specific measure of
redistribution, the parameter governing within-country convergence β1n,t−1 in the growth
equation now also varies only between countries and over time.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the measurement of redistribution at the
regional level (ρ′nit) according to equation (1a), and at the country level (ρnt) according
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to equation (3). The figure shows the case of Belgium in the year 2000. The time index
t = 2000 is omitted in the graph and in this paragraph to avoid cluttering. The horizontal
axis shows the deviation of the regional primary per capita household income from the
country-year average, i.e. the relative regional income position before redistribution. The
vertical axis shows the deviation of the regional disposable (or secondary) per capita
household income from the country-year average, after redistribution. The country level
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Figure 1: Interregional redistribution between the NUTS2 regions in Belgium in the year 2000.
The horizontal axis shows the relative deviation of the regional per capita primary
income from the country average. The vertical axis shows the relative deviation of
the regional per capita disposable income from the country average. The dashed line
shows the linear fit, and the difference of the slope of this line with the solid 45-degree
line shows the average rate of redistribution in the country ρn for the given year. The
difference between the slope of the 45-degree line and the slope of the ray through the
origin for each region corresponds to the regional redistribution rate ρ′ni.
redistribution measure ρBE is given by the difference between the slope of the linear fit
including all regions (dashed line) and the solid 45 degree line which has a slope of 1. The
regional redistribution measures ρ′ni are given by the difference between the slope of the 45
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degree line and the ray through the origin for the region i under consideration. For most
regions, the value of ρ′ni is relatively close to the country-wide measure ρBE = 0.32. Yet, for
some regions ρ′ni takes on extreme values. The case of BE25 (West-Vlaanderen) is illustrated
in the graph (dotted line). The value ρ′BE25 = 1.85 signifies that policy has reversed the
initial disadvantageous average income position of this region. This is not very informative,
however, given that the income difference relative to the country average is quite small for
this region both before and after government intervention. Moreover, for regions close to the
origin the regional ρ′ni are erratic over time.
9 Overall, the fit of regression (3) is quite good
and as such the country-level redistribution measure ρnt captures the overall redistributive
policy of the countries quite well. This also holds for other countries and years. Given the
problems associated with estimating regional redistribution rates described in this section,
we therefore use the country level measure of redistribution ρnt in the remainder of this
paper.
The first column of table 1 shows the rate of redistribution obtained from estimating
equation (3) for all euro area countries in our sample in 1995. The rate of redistribution for
France in table 1 is close to the value of 0.38 reported by Me´litz and Zumer (2002).
ρ1995 ρ2007 − ρ1995 cv1995 cv2007 − cv1995 yn1995 yn2007 regions
FI 0.60 −0.09 0.19 −0.04 2.18 2.54 5
NL 0.43 0.03 0.09 0.03 2.50 2.68 12
FR 0.39 0.01 0.13 −0.02 2.40 2.62 22
BE 0.37 −0.06 0.15 0.01 2.67 2.80 11
DE 0.33 0.05 0.17 0.00 2.67 2.80 39
PT 0.31 −0.04 0.20 0.05 2.01 2.12 5
ES 0.28 −0.08 0.21 −0.01 2.19 2.47 16
AT 0.21 0.21 0.10 −0.04 2.61 2.86 9
IT 0.15 0.05 0.28 −0.04 2.54 2.58 21
Table 1: The rate of interregional redistribution ρnt, the coefficient of variation in regional primary
income cvnt, and changes therein between 1995-2007 in the different EU member states
in the sample. The last three columns show the 1995 and 2007 level of per capita
primary income (in logs), and the number of retained NUTS 2 regions.
9For Brussels (BE10), for the year 2000 shown in the graph ρ′BE10 = 2.64, but in 1998 the value was
−3.06, for example.
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3.3. Redistribution and within-country inequality
The third column of table 1 reports the level of regional disparity in primary income in
1995 in each country as expressed by the coefficient of variation.10 The level of redistribution
and the level of regional primary income disparity are clearly inversely related. The left
panel of figure 2 further illustrates this cross-sectional relationship between redistribution
and regional disparities by plotting the time-averaged regional disparities within a country
against the time-averaged rate of interregional redistribution.
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Figure 2: Left panel: within-country regional disparities as measured by the average coefficient
of variation in the regional primary income over the years 1995-2007 (vertical axis)
and the average rate of within-country interregional redistribution ρn (vertical axis).
Right panel: the relationship between interregional redistribution in 1995 (horizontal
axis) and the change in regional inequality over the years 1995-2007 (vertical axis).
The linear fit shown in the graph weighs by country population.
Although studying the relationship between the levels of redistribution and inequality
is interesting, investigating the evolution of inequality is more relevant for an analysis of
regional convergence. The right panel of figure 2 shows that the observed negative correlation
between the level of redistribution and the level of regional inequality is completely reversed
when considering the relation between the level of redistribution in 1995 and the change in
regional inequality in primary income over the years 1995-2007. This positive relationship
between the level of within-country redistribution and subsequent change in inequality was
also found by Kessler and Lessmann (2008) for a set of highly developed OECD countries.
The following regression addresses more formally how the rate of redistribution ρnt
and a vector of other determinants Xnt in a country relate to changes in regional income
10The coefficient of variation equals the standard deviation divided by the average.
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disparities as measured by changes in the coefficient of variation cvnt. We allow for country
dummies ηn and year dummies ξt.
∆cvnt = ρn,t−1 + γXn,t−1 + ηn + ξt + nt. (5)
This specification is essentially a type of conditional σ-convergence analysis. When including
country fixed-effects, the change in regional income variation should be interpreted as changes
relative to the country average, thus controlling for country-specific trends in the evolution
of regional inequality and levels of the rate of redistribution which might differ between
countries in a non-random fashion. The specification also includes year dummies to control
for unobserved common shocks to both dependent and independent variables which might
affect the results.
Table 2 reports the result of estimating various versions of equation (5). Given that the
large differences in country sizes affect how relevant the country-level observations are to
the overall evolution of regional inequality, the estimations use weighted least squares with
total country population as weights. Column (I) first considers the effect of the level of
Dependent variable: ∆cvnt
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
ρn,t−τ 0.114
∗
0.0123
∗∗∗
0.0428
∗∗∗
0.0371
∗∗∗
0.0622
∗∗∗
(0.0596) (0.00429) (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0199)
covunempn,t−τ 0.0486
∗∗∗
(0.0122)
covoldn,t−τ −0.130∗
(0.0766)
covdeathn,t−τ 0.00251
(0.00424)
covagrisharen,t−τ −0.000170
(0.0256)
constant −0.0459∗∗ −0.00489∗∗∗ −0.0152∗∗∗ −0.0125∗∗∗ −0.0125
(0.0168) (0.00152) (0.00406) (0.00444) (0.0141)
N 9 108 108 108 77
R2 0.289 0.072 0.208 0.357 0.585
year dummies No No No Yes Yes
country dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
τ 12 1 1 1 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 2: The effect of redistribution and other variables on the subsequent evolution of within-
country regional income disparity in EU member states.
redistribution in 1995 on the change in regional inequality between 1995 and 2007, without
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other covariates, and excluding country or time dummies. This cross-sectional specification
corresponds to the linear fit shown in the right panel of figure 2. The positive coefficient
on the 1995 level of redistribution indicates that -on average- countries with a high level
of redistribution in 1995 are characterised by a subsequent interregional divergence in
primary income over the period 1995-2007. Column (II) repeats this analysis while pooling
cross-sectional and time series information. It considers the effect of the one-year-lagged
level of redistribution on the subsequent year-on-year change in regional inequality. Column
(III) adds country-fixed effects to this specification, while column (IV) considers the case
with both country and year dummies. Column (V) includes some other factors which might
be correlated with both the level of redistribution and subsequent changes in inequality, such
as the coefficient of variation of unemployment, the share of elderly people in the regional
population, the mortality rate, and the share of agriculture in regional employment. The
positive relationship between redistribution and subsequent changes in regional inequality
holds over all specifications.11
How the negative cross-sectional correlation between the level of redistribution and the
level of inequality can co-exist with a positive relation between the level of redistribution
and the change in inequality is an interesting question. One explanation could be that only
countries with small levels of regional inequality are willing and able to set a high rate of
redistribution, thereby decreasing regional inequality in disposable income significantly in
relative terms, without this implying or necessitating large absolute interregional income
flows. Such a policy would severely slow down convergence of regions in the case of an
asymmetric negative regional economic shock, however, and therefore one can expect a
positive correlation between the level of redistribution and the change in regional inequality.
In the long run the high rate of redistribution may become untenable since the same level
of redistribution implies higher absolute interregional redistributive flows when regional
inequality rises. For countries with large interregional income differences, sustaining a high
rate of redistribution may simply not be an option politically or otherwise. If countries
with high levels of regional inequality are forced to use low rates of redistribution in the
long run, this could explain the negative correlation in levels observed cross-sectionally.
The previous paragraphs considered the relationship between redistribution and within-
country regional income differences. As a country-level summary statistic the coefficient of
variation in regional primary income is hardly suited for an analysis of the differences in
11The coefficient on redistribution in column (I) should be divided by 12 when comparing with the other
columns which consider yearly changes.
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regional growth rates which are driving the observed changes in regional income disparity.
It is impossible to determine whether redistribution increases disparities by decreasing
growth in poorer regions, or rather by increasing growth in richer regions, for example.
The next section therefore explicitly considers regional growth and its determinants. By
investigating how the growth rates of regions depend on their initial level of income it
can be determined whether convergence in primary income can be expected. In turn, by
considering how redistribution affects the relationship between the initial level of income
and regional growth, the effect of redistribution on regional convergence can be determined.
4. Redistribution as a determinant of regional growth and β-convergence
Our empirical strategy to asses the effect of redistribution on growth and convergence
consists of four parts.
Section 4.1 stays close to the growth equations suggested by theory. The average growth
rate over the entire time span of the sample is considered as the dependent variable. The
initial levels of variables in 1995 are used as explanatory variables. In such a cross-sectional
setting it is impossible to simultaneously identify an effect of redistribution and allow for
fixed differences in the within-country convergence rates.
Section 4.2 uses year-on-year growth rates as the dependent variable and one-year
lagged variables as explanatory variables. Pooling cross-sectional and time-series data
allows to estimate an effect of redistribution while controlling for time-constant differences
in convergence rates between countries. This approach adds greatly to robustness: only
changes over time in the rate of redistribution and within-country convergence rate are
used to identify the effect of redistribution on convergence.
Section 4.3 takes the analysis one step further by controlling for regional fixed effects.
Such an approach is robust in the presence of time-invariant omitted variables on the
regional level. Including regional fixed effects implies that convergence is considered towards
region-specific steady states, however. Such a type of conditional convergence analysis is
interesting in its own respect but may be less informative towards explaining observed
cross-sectional regional income disparity in the EU.
As a robustness-check for endogeneity of redistribution, section 4.4 uses the GMM
technique of Arellano and Bond (1991) to identify the effect of redistribution on convergence.
4.1. Cross-sectional analysis of redistribution and β-convergence
Figure 3 shows a scatterplot of the log of regional primary income per capita in 1995
versus the average annual growth rate of this variable over the years 1995-2007, for all
17
140 NUTS2 regions in the 9 euro area countries in our sample. The overall shape of the
point-cloud points to β-convergence: on average initially poorer regions grew faster over
the period under consideration. The bold line illustrates a specific type of between-country
convergence as the estimated weighted linear relationship between 9 pairs of country-
averages of initial regional income and growth, using the number of regions in each country
as weights. The slope equals -0.0194, which corresponds to an annual between-country
convergence rate of about 2.2 percent.12 The thinner dashed lines in figure 3 illustrate
within-country convergence as the relationship between initial regional income per capita
and subsequent growth, for regions within individual countries. An important observation
is that, with the exception of Austria, all countries in the sample are characterised by slower
within-country regional convergence rates compared to the between country convergence
rate. The upward slopes for Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands indicate that these
countries experienced regional β-divergence. The fourth column of table 1 shows that this
was accompanied by an increase in regional income disparity in these countries as measured
by the change in the coefficient of variation of primary income.
Figure 3 can be seen as a graphical illustration of equation (4) after adapting it to
consider the average regional growth over a 12 year time-span:
yni2007 − yni1995
12
= c− β1n1995
12
(yni1995 − yn1995)− β2
12
yn1995 + zni1995. (6)
Equation (6) is essentially a cross-sectional regression. All variables which are constant such
as the overall initial income level y1995 are absorbed by the constant. Column (I) in table 3
shows the corresponding estimated coefficients. The point estimate of the coefficient on
the initial country-wide average income level yn1995 expresses the speed of between-country
convergence and corresponds to the slope of the bold line in figure 3.13
As was already clear from figure 3, the estimated within-country convergence rates (the
country-specific coefficients on yni1995 − yn1995) shown in column (I) are lower than the
estimated between country convergence rate (the coefficient on yn1995), except for Austria.
The estimated homogeneous within-country convergence rate in column (II) (obtained when
12A country with a 1995 per capita income one unit above the 1995 average has an estimated average
annual growth rate over the period 1995-2007 which is 0.0194 below the sample-wide average growth rate.
In 2007 its income will therefore be 1 - 12×0.0194 above the average income. This value -by definition-
equals the value (1 − r)12 where r is the rate at which economies converge. Equating both values and
solving for r shows r = 1− (1− 12× 0.019)1/12 = 0.022.
13The coefficient on yn1995 corresponds exactly to the slope of the bold line in figure 3 because the linear
fit in the graph weighs the country-averaged income and growth by the number of regions in each country.
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Dependent variable: (yni2007 − yni1995)/12
(I) (II) (III)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(AT) −0.0401
(0.0324)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(BE) 0.00392
(0.00284)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(DE) −0.00594∗∗
(0.00279)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(ES) −0.00939
(0.00669)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(FI) −0.0166
(0.0257)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(FR) −0.0119
(0.0102)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(IT) −0.0124
(0.00798)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(NL) 0.0225∗∗
(0.0102)
[yni1995 − yn1995]×I(PT) 0.0179
(0.0385)
[yni1995 − yn1995] −0.00843∗∗ −0.0160∗∗
(0.00339) (0.00637)
[yni1995 − yn1995]× ρn1995 0.0281
(0.0201)
yn1995 −0.0194∗∗∗ −0.0194∗∗∗ −0.0168∗∗∗
(0.00402) (0.00404) (0.00379)
ρn1995 0.0320
∗∗∗
(0.00491)
constant 0.0623
∗∗∗
0.0623
∗∗∗
0.0454
∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0101)
N 140 140 140
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 3: Cross-sectional analysis of regional growth and convergence. A specification with hetero-
geneous speed of within-country convergence and excluding an effect of redistribution
(column I), homogeneous within-country convergence excluding an effect of redistribu-
tion (column II), and homogeneous within-country convergence including an effect of
redistribution (column III).
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Figure 3: β-convergence in per capita primary income. There is clear evidence for convergence
in that poorer countries are growing faster than richer regions (bold line). There is
less evidence of convergence within countries (dashed lines). Many member states
experience slow regional convergence or even divergence.
imposing β1n = β1) is about half the between-country convergence rate. This difference is
significant at the 5 percent level.14
As argued in the previous sections, the observed lack of within-country regional conver-
gence may be related to distorting redistributive schemes on the country level, as opposed to
convergence between member states where redistribution is much more limited. Equations
(4) and (6) can straightforwardly be rewritten to single out the effect of redistribution
14It is unsurprising that the point estimate of the between-country convergence rate does not change
between column (I) and (II), since the variable [yni1995 − yn1995] is by construction mean-zero on the
country-year level and thereby strictly uncorrelated with variables on the country-year level such as
yn1995. Vice-versa, adding or removing country-year level variables does not affect the estimated speed of
within-country convergence and these estimates therefore are robust to the omission of any variable on the
country-year level.
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on convergence.15 In a cross-sectional setting there are insufficient degrees of freedom to
allow for a country-specific convergence rate and simultaneously investigate the effect of
redistribution thereon. Homogeneity of the within country convergence rates is therefore
imposed when analysing the effect of redistribution on this rate in a cross-section. Collecting
all time-invariant terms in the constant as before, we have
yni2007 − yni1995
12
= c−β
0
1
12
(yni1995−yn1995)+β
0
1
12
ρn1995(yni1995−yn1995)−β2
12
yn1995+zni1995. (7)
This specification essentially attributes all between-country differences in the average within-
country convergence rates over the years 1995-2007 solely to differences in their 1995 rate
of redistribution ρn1995. Column (III) of table 3 shows the results. The positive interaction
effect of redistribution and relative regional income implies that countries with high 1995
rates of redistribution on average have slower 1995-2007 convergence rates. The p-value on
this coefficient is only 0.164, however.
The coefficients on country-level income and relative regional-level income in column (III)
are about equal in size and are not significantly different. This implies that in the absence
of redistribution (ρ = 0) the estimated speed of within and between country convergence is
about equal. This is compatible with the theoretical framework only if factors are equally
mobile within and between countries, which seems unlikely. Moreover, if the coefficient
on the interaction term ρn1995(yni1995 − yn1995) indeed exceeds the coefficient on relative
regional income (yni1995 − yn1995) in absolute value, this would imply that regional income
diverges within countries under a policy of complete income redistribution (ρ = 1). This
behaviour is not consistent with the neoclassical framework developed above, where the
coefficients on relative regional income and on the interaction with the rate of redistribution
are predicted to be of equal size but opposite sign (see equation (7)).
The coefficient on ρn1995 reflects the marginal effect of redistribution on growth for a
region with an initial income level equal to the country average (for which yni1995−yn1995 = 0).
Redistribution was not predicted to have such an ‘overall’ effect on regional growth rates
in the model of section 2.2. Nevertheless, the estimated overall effect of redistribution
on growth is positive and significant.16 This will no longer be the case in any of the
15Define β01n = bn(1− (1− a)(1− d)) such that β1nt = β01n − β01nρnt.
16Some channels through which redistribution could have an overall effect on regional growth may include
a stabilising effect of redistribution, reducing social tension. An example of a possible direct negative effect
would be the financing of non-productive government expenditure through progressive direct taxes, which
at the same time would lower the propensity to work or invest. We leave it up to the data to reveal whether
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specifications including country or regional fixed effects which are considered below.
The cross-sectional empirical analysis presented so far is simple and the results can be
graphically illustrated and interpreted as in figure 3. A cross-sectional analysis has several
limitations, however. Within-country convergence rates may differ because of factors such
as inherent differences in within-country labour mobility between different countries, and
these factors may be related to the rate of redistribution. A time series analysis allows to
estimate both heterogeneous country-specific within-country convergence rates and measure
the effect of redistribution thereon. The estimated effect of redistribution on convergence
then is robust to the omission of time-constant factors on the country level.
4.2. Pooled cross-section time-series analysis of redistribution and β-convergence
Rather than identifying the effect of redistribution on convergence in a purely cross-
sectional framework as above, we now turn to a pooled cross-section time series analysis. To
this aim the yearly regional growth rate ynit − yni,t−1 replaces the average regional growth
between 1995 and 2007 as the dependent variable. The estimation equation becomes
ynit − yni,t−1 = ηt − β01(yni,t−1 − yn,t−1) + β01ρn,t−1(yni,t−1 − yn,t−1)− β2yn,t−1 + znit. (8)
Time dummies ηt absorb all terms in equation (4) which change only over time. Table 4
shows the results, but only column (II) corresponds fully to estimation equation (8).
Column (I) deviates from equation (8) in that it does not separate out the effect of
redistribution on within-country convergence. As in the cross-sectional analysis, it is found
that -without controlling for redistribution- within-country convergence typically is slow
and some countries even show regional divergence. All countries but Austria exhibit slower
within country convergence compared to between-country convergence.
Column (II) considers the effect of redistribution on within-country convergence. The
coefficients on the variables yni,t−1−yn,t−1 show the within-country regional convergence rate
(towards the country-year specific average) in the hypothetical case ρn,t−1 = 0. The typical
predicted speed of within-country convergence under ρn,t−1 = 0 is fast, in the order of 10
percent annually, although the rates differ significantly between countries. Redistribution is
predicted to slow within-country convergence. The estimated effect is large and statistically
highly significant. The estimated overall effect of redistribution on growth is positive and
significant.
the total direct effect is positive or negative.
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Dependent variable: ynit − yni,t−1
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(AT) −0.0425∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0343) (0.0292)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(BE) 0.00304 −0.0930∗∗∗ −0.0930∗∗∗
(0.00614) (0.0307) (0.0285)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(DE) −0.00367 −0.120∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(0.00243) (0.0366) (0.0340)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(ES) −0.00908 −0.0798∗∗∗ −0.0798∗∗∗
(0.00584) (0.0223) (0.0204)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(FI) −0.0151 −0.159∗∗∗ −0.159∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0499) (0.0458)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(FR) −0.0149∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.00904) (0.0355) (0.0330)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(IT) −0.0144∗∗∗ −0.0616∗∗∗ −0.0616∗∗∗
(0.00515) (0.0166) (0.0154)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(NL) 0.00851 −0.113∗∗ −0.113∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0465) (0.0456)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(PT) 0.0143 −0.0610∗∗ −0.0610∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0283) (0.0250)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1] −0.00817∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗ −0.0225∗∗∗
(0.00238) (0.00726) (0.00687)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]× ρnt−1 0.284∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.0486∗∗ 0.0486∗∗
(0.0894) (0.0829) (0.0214) (0.0204)
ynt−1 −0.0176∗∗∗ −0.0234∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.0176∗∗∗ −0.0234∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.00244) (0.00262) (0.0172) (0.00246) (0.00265) (0.0174)
ρnt−1 0.0338
∗∗∗ −0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ −0.0456∗∗∗
(0.00477) (0.0133) (0.00476) (0.0134)
N 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680 1680
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 4: Pooled cross-section time-series analysis of annual regional growth, 1995-2007. Column
(I) includes country×year effects which also capture any effect of the initial country-
level income yn,t−1 Column (II) allows for an effect of redistribution on within-country
convergence rates. Column (III) uses only year dummies, but also includes an effect of
country-level initial income.
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Specification (II) closely follows the simple theoretical framework presented in section
2. In reality, however, an important concern is that there might be omitted variables
correlated both with regional growth and the rate of redistribution. As was already argued,
such omitted variables on the country-year level are by construction uncorrelated with
the variable yni,t−1 − yn,t−1 and its interaction with redistribution and can not bias the
estimated effect of redistribution on convergence. But they could still bias the estimated
speed of between-country convergence and the overall effect of redistribution on regional
growth.
Column (III) is our preferred specification. It uses country dummies to control for
any omitted time-invariant variable on the country level. Only within-country variation
over time is used to identify the speed of within-country convergence, how it is affected
by redistribution, and for the effect of redistribution on growth. The introduction of
country dummies does not affect the results related to within-country convergence. It does
matter greatly for the interpretation of the estimated speed of between-country convergence.
The coefficient on yn,t−1 now reflects the speed of convergence towards a country-specific
mean (adjusted for shocks common to all countries in a specific year given the presence
of year dummies). Importantly, controlling for country fixed effects, the overall effect of
redistribution on growth becomes negative and significant.
Taking the average of the country-specific coefficients on yni,t−1 − yn,t−1 in column (I)
shows that the average rate of within-country convergence in all countries in our sample
is about 0.4 percent annually. Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal exhibit regional
divergence. According to the results presented in specifications (II) and (III), a decrease in
the rate of redistribution with about 20 percent (not percentage points) in all countries
is predicted to restore regional convergence in all countries in the sample. It would result
in an average rate of within-country convergence of 2.5 percent. This is about the size of
the estimated rate of between country convergence (2.34 percent) in column (II). Further
lowering ρn,t−1 leads to predicted rates of within-country convergence which significantly
exceed the estimated rate of between-country convergence.
These results point to redistribution as the main reason why the observed within-
country convergence rates are below the between-country convergence rates. For low
levels of redistribution convergence of regional income towards the country-year average is
predicted to be much faster compared to the rate of convergence of countries towards the
EU-year average. The results are consistent with theory if labour mobility in function of
disposable income differences is much faster within countries compared to between countries,
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which seems very likely.
The results are also robust to the omission of any variable on the country-year level.
This also explains why specifications (II) and (III) provide the same quantitative results
regarding convergence. Adding country×year dummies to specification (II) or (III) would
result in identical estimates for convergence and the effect of redistribution thereon.
To further illustrate the interpretation of the results Appendix A considers Germany as
a specific example.
Column (IV) to (VI) correspond to the specifications in columns (I) to (III), except for
imposing homogeneity of within-country convergence rates. The estimated homogeneous
rate of within-country convergence under ρ = 0 from column (V) is much smaller than the
heterogeneous counterparts in column (II). One reason for this is the bias which is introduced
by imposing a homogeneous slope parameter when the true underlying parameters are
heterogeneous. Another, however, is that with heterogeneous slopes, only purely within-
country variation is used to estimate the speed of within-country convergence. With
homogeneous slopes, also between-country variation in regional growth and the relative
income position (of regions vis-a-vis the country-year average) is used for identification.
The main results remain, however: redistribution significantly slows convergence, and when
controlling for country-fixed effects the effect of redistribution on regional growth for a
region with an initial income close to the country average is negative.
4.3. Controlling for regional characteristics: redistribution and conditional β-convergence
The specifications in section 4.2 used pooled time series and cross-sectional information.
None of these regressions included regional fixed effects. Within-country regional convergence
was considered relative to the country-year specific average income level. Region-specific
steady states were not considered.
Region-specific omitted variables -say the cultural background of a region or the presence
of a past severe and persistent negative regional productivity shock- may cause steady state
growth rates to differ between regions. Lack of convergence may be due to correlation
between regional growth impeding conditions and initial income. Such factors are unlikely
to be correlated with the measure of redistribution, however, given that redistribution is
measured on the country level. Still, these factors would affect the estimated speed of
within-country convergence. This section therefore reconsiders the effect of redistribution
on convergence and growth when regional fixed effects are controlled for. Including regional
dummies implies that convergence is considered towards a region-specific steady state
growth path, conditional on all omitted time-constant factors on the regional level.
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Table 5 shows the result of several regional growth regressions which include regional
fixed effects. Columns (I) and (III) do not include an effect of redistribution, columns
(II) and (IV) separate out the effect of redistribution on regional growth and conditional
regional convergence. The estimated homogeneous convergence rates in columns (III) and
(IV) are lower compared to their typical heterogeneous counterparts in columns (I) and
(II), as before.
As expected, the estimated rate of convergence conditional on the regional fixed effects
is much faster compared to the rate of unconditional regional convergence towards the
country-year average presented in the previous section. Again Austria is an exception. The
effect of redistribution on growth and convergence is large and significant in all specifications.
As the size of the coefficient on the interaction effect with redistribution is about half the
size on the coefficient on initial relative regional income, even with complete redistribution
most regions are predicted to converge. In specification (IV), in the absence of within-
country redistribution the estimated speed of regional convergence (towards a region-specific
steady state) is higher than the estimated speed of convergence of countries towards their
country-specific (common year effect corrected) steady state.
To illustrate the robustness of these results, table 6 takes the fixed-effects analysis one
step further by including more covariates. All specifications in table 6 impose homogeneity
of convergence rates between countries to preserve some degrees of freedom.
Column (I) shows a specification including 108 country×year dummies. Apart from
these dummies and the regional fixed effects, relative regional income and the interaction
effect with redistribution are the sole covariates. As before, redistribution is predicted
to considerably slow regional convergence. Nevertheless, even with full redistribution the
speed of convergence towards regional specific steady state remains fast, as in table 5.
Column (II) adds the length of the regional highway system and a regional index of
human resources in science and technology as covariates. These variables are used as proxies
for transport infrastructure and human capital, potentially important drivers of regional
growth. Both are expressed as deviations from the country-year average.17 It turns out
that both transport infrastructure and human capital have a significant overall effect on
regional growth. The growth effects are also stronger for initially poorer regions (given the
negative sign of the interactions with yni,t−1 − yn,t−1). A policy increasing the overall level
of transport infrastructure or human capital is therefore predicted to significantly increase
17Different from the case ρnt = 0, the question on the speed of convergence for extremely low levels of
transport infrastructure (logmotor=0) or human capital (loghigher=0) is hardly interesting.
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Dependent variable: ynit − yni,t−1
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(AT) 0.00334 −0.0187
(0.0569) (0.0966)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(BE) −0.172∗∗ −0.214∗∗
(0.0694) (0.0835)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(DE) −0.106∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0374)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(ES) −0.0496 −0.0993
(0.0634) (0.0703)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(FI) −0.103 −0.155∗∗∗
(0.0743) (0.0521)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(FR) −0.356∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗
(0.0557) (0.0609)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(IT) −0.264∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗
(0.0479) (0.0501)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(NL) −0.435∗∗∗ −0.501∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.109)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(PT) −0.273 −0.297
(0.193) (0.213)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1] −0.178∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0318)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]× ρnt−1 0.162∗ 0.143∗∗
(0.0823) (0.0694)
ynt−1 −0.107∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0179) (0.0162) (0.0185)
ρnt−1 −0.0456∗∗ −0.0456∗∗
(0.0179) (0.0188)
N 1680 1680 1680 1680
region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 5: Pooled cross-section time-series analysis of regional growth, including regional dummies
(regional fixed effects) and year dummies.
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Dependent variable: ynit − yni,t−1
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1] −0.214∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0359) (0.0442)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]× ρnt−1 0.112∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.136∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.0505) (0.0507) (0.0746) (0.0881)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]× logmotornit−1 −0.0252∗∗ −0.0112 −0.00835
(0.0121) (0.0140) (0.0155)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]× loghighernit−1 −0.0475∗∗ −0.0448 −0.0604∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0281) (0.0302)
logmotornit−1 0.00805
∗∗∗
0.00622
∗∗
0.00706
∗∗
0.00120
(0.00274) (0.00302) (0.00353) (0.00480)
loghighernit−1 0.0178
∗∗∗
0.0149
∗∗∗
0.0178
∗∗∗
0.0134
∗
(0.00526) (0.00556) (0.00660) (0.00758)
yn,t−1 −0.132∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗
(0.0212) (0.0298)
ρn,t−1 −0.0586∗∗∗ −0.0838∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0260)
logcovn,t−1 −0.0563∗∗∗ −0.0117
(0.0110) (0.0157)
covunempn,t−1 −0.0269∗∗∗ −0.0348∗∗∗
(0.00612) (0.00749)
covagrisharen,t−1 0.0677
∗∗∗
0.0594
∗∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0230)
covoldn,t−1 0.317
∗∗∗
(0.0801)
unemprateni,t−1 −0.0292
(0.0298)
agrishareni,t−1 −0.120∗∗
(0.0527)
oldrateni,t−1 0.0886
(0.0619)
N 1628 1628 1556 1327
year dummies No No Yes Yes
country×year dummies Yes Yes No No
region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 6: Pooled cross-section time-series analysis of regional growth, including regional fixed
effects.
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growth in all regions, and more so in initially poorer regions. A regional policy specifically
targeting poorer regions would obviously benefit poorer regions even more.
The country×year dummies which were added in columns (I) and (II) make it impossible
to estimate the speed of between-country convergence or the overall effect of redistribution
on growth, since ρnt and ynt vary only on the country-year level. Rather than including
the country×year dummies, specification (III) controls for some possibly relevant omitted
variables on the country-year level. The lagged country-level disparity in four variables
is added: primary income, the unemployment rate, the sectoral share of agriculture, and
the share of elderly people in the population. As expected, this does not greatly affect
the estimated effect of redistribution on regional convergence. If anything, the effect of
redistribution on regional convergence becomes even stronger in this specification. The
estimated overall effect on growth is negative.
Column (IV) shows furthermore that the main result pertaining to the effect of redistri-
bution on growth and convergence remain to hold when adding the regional unemployment
rate, share of agriculture and share of elderly in the population as covariates, although the
overall significance of the results deteriorates given the small number of observations for
which all these covariates is available.
Overall, in the presented results with regional fixed effects, a decrease in the level of
redistribution is predicted to slow regional convergence towards a region-specific steady
state. In the specifications without country×year dummies the overall growth effect of
redistribution could also be estimated. In all of these specifications, a reduction in the rate
of redistribution is predicted to increase the growth rate of per capita primary income all
regions and the growth effect is stronger in initially poorer regions.
4.4. Instrumenting redistribution using the Arellano and Bond (1991) method
Despite the fact that it is unlikely that the growth performance of an individual region
affects the country-wide rate of redistribution, it might be interesting to apply standard
methods to control for the possible endogeneity of the redistribution variable as a robustness
check. To control for endogeneity we apply the methodology of Arellano and Bond (1991).
Their method can be summarised as first-differencing of the growth regression to remove the
regional fixed effects, and subsequently using lags of the potentially endogenous variables
as instruments for the equation in differences. Adding more lags gives more identification
restrictions which can be exploited in a GMM framework. If appropriate conditions hold,
adding the growth equation in levels and using differenced variables as instruments allows
for even more identification restrictions. Lately, the dangers of using too many instruments
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Dependent variable: ynit − yni,t−1
(I) (II) (III)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1] −0.103∗∗ −0.143∗∗
(0.0449) (0.0696)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]× ρnt−1 0.499∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.539∗
(0.153) (0.164) (0.297)
ynt−1 −0.211∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗
(0.0743) (0.0755)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(AT) −0.169
(0.151)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(BE) −0.111
(0.0907)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(DE) 0.155
(1.219)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(ES) −0.132
(0.291)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(FI) 0.00400
(0.182)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(FR) −0.144
(0.136)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(IT) −0.123∗∗
(0.0510)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(NL) −0.378
(0.299)
[ynit−1 − ynt−1]×I(PT) 0.00506
(0.356)
ρnt−1 −0.236∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗
(0.0860) (0.100)
constant 0.0166
∗∗∗
0.614
∗∗∗
0.555
∗∗∗
(0.00274) (0.201) (0.214)
N 1680 1680 1680
Number of instruments 4 22 6
Hansen 0.363 0.462 0.693
AR(1) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2) 0.264 0.406 0.414
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.1,
∗∗
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01
Table 7: GMM estimation. Column (I) includes country×year dummies. Column (II) includes
year dummies only, but allows for a heterogeneous within-country convergence rate.
Column (III) imposes identical regional convergence rates in all countries apart from
the effect of redistribution.
has been emphasised by several authors, such as Roodman (2009). We therefore restrict the
lag structure of the instruments to a maximum of two and collapse the instrument matrix.
Our results are robust to using only level instruments for the equation in differences. The
resulting number of instruments is reported with the estimation results in table 7.
Column (I) shows a specification including country×year dummies. The relative income
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position and the interaction with redistribution are the sole other covariates. They are
instrumented by the third and fourth lag in the equation in first differences, and their
first differences are used as instruments for the equation in levels. The Hansen test of
over-identifying restrictions is given in the table and does not reject the validity of the
instruments on standard significance levels.
Column (II) includes only year dummies, not country×year dummies. The within-
country convergence rates are instrumented using the third and fourth lag. All other
variables (except for the year dummies) are instrumented using the fourth and fifth lag. The
heterogeneous within-country convergence rates at ρnt = 0 are estimated very imprecisely.
The estimated effect of redistribution is large and significant, however.
The specification in column (III) is identical to column (II) except for imposing ho-
mogeneity of the within-country convergence rate. Both the estimated level effect of
redistribution and the effect on within-country convergence is rather similar in column (II)
and (III) and are in line with earlier findings.
5. Summary and conclusion
Countries redistribute significant amounts of wealth between regions. Economic theory
suggests that these flows may have an effect on regional growth and convergence between
regions. This paper introduced a simple neo-classical model showing a possible negative
effect of redistribution on convergence. The model provided a regional growth equation
encompassing between-country convergence, within-country convergence, and an effect of
income redistribution on within-country convergence.
The effect of within-country interregional income redistribution on regional income
growth and convergence was then empirically investigated using data on 140 regions from
9 EU member states for the years 1995-2007. The empirical analysis is inspired by the
growth equation derived from theory, but also considers various more flexible specifications.
In a wide variety of settings interregional income redistribution was found to substantially
slow regional within-country income convergence.
Cross-sectional differences between countries in the 1995 levels of within-country inter-
regional income redistribution entirely explain the difference between relatively fast overall
convergence between EU countries and relatively slow within-country convergence over the
years 1995-2007 (table 3). However, attributing all observed differences between countries
in within-country convergence rates solely to differences between countries in redistribution
is flawed in the presence of omitted variables influencing both variables.
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Using pooled cross-section time-series this paper therefore subsequently allowed for
time-invariant differences between countries in the speed of within-country convergence, and
used only information on changes in redistribution and subsequent changes in the speed of
within-country convergence to identify the effect of redistribution on convergence. In these
specifications, the estimated effect of redistribution on within-country convergence is strong.
According to these results, all of the observed difference between the convergence rate of
regions towards the country-year average income and the rate of convergence of countries
towards the EU-year average can be explained by differences in the rate of redistribution
between countries. The estimated rate of within-country convergence is predicted to equal
the rate of between-country convergence, should levels of redistribution be lowered by 20
percent relative to their current levels. At lower levels of redistribution, the predicted
within-country convergence rate significantly exceeds the between-country convergence rate.
Specifications including regional fixed effects are quite different in that they consider
region-specific steady states. These ‘conditional’ rates of convergence tend to be much
faster than their unconditional counterparts. Redistribution is also found to significantly
slow conditional convergence, but the effect is smaller in relative terms.
These results on conditional convergence are confirmed after controlling for covariates
such as the regional dispersion of unemployment in a country, and when using system-GMM
to control for possible endogeneity. Adding proxies for transport infrastructure and human
capital suggest a positive effect on regional growth without an economically or statistically
significant effect on convergence. Policy measures targeting transport infrastructure and
education in poorer regions may therefore be better means to achieve higher regional growth
and convergence. These investments should preferably be paid for by taxes which are
neutral with respect to relative regional factor prices.
Whereas redistribution has the obvious effect of equalising disposable income between
regions, our results suggest it comes at the double cost of a lower aggregate growth rate,
and an even lower growth rate in backward regions. The lower growth rates in backward
regions imply that redistribution causes slower convergence or even divergence, and may
thus create a need for redistribution over a longer time period, or even more redistribution
in the future. This would make redistributive systems impossible to maintain, or lead to
increasing tensions between regions within the same country as can be observed in some
EU member states today.
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Appendix A. The case of Germany as an example
This section considers the estimated effect of redistribution on growth and convergence
for the case of Germany as an illustration.
The effect of redistribution on convergence
We use the results from specification (II) and (III) in table 4 to estimate the effect of
redistribution on convergence. These specifications pool time series and cross-sectional
information, which allows for heterogeneous levels of within-country convergence apart from
the effect of redistribution thereon. This is important in order to control for time-invariant
country characteristics which may be correlated both with the level of redistribution and
the speed of convergence.
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We specifically do not consider specifications with regional fixed effects in this section as
we want to focus on convergence of regional per capita income towards a common country-
year specific steady state. Including regional dummies would imply region-specific steady
states which are less relevant to explaining within-country regional income differences.
Consider the case of Germany in the year 2000. The observed rate of redistribution
ρn,t−1 was 0.43. Using the results from column (II) or (III) in table 4, the total coefficient
on regional relative initial income yni,t−1 − yn,t−1 at this level for redistribution equals
−0.120 + (0.43)(0.284) = 0.0021. Regional income therefore is predicted to diverge at a
rate of 0.21 percent in 2000, but this rate is not significantly different from zero.
In the hypothetical case of a ten percentage point decrease in the German rate of
redistribution to ρnt = 0.33, the predicted rate of within-country convergence would be
2.63 percent annually. This rate is significantly different from zero. It is rather similar in
magnitude as the speed of convergence of countries towards the EU average (2.34 percent
annually). Setting ρnt = 0 results in a predicted annual within-country convergence rate of
12 percent for Germany.
The effect of redistribution on regional growth
In contrast to the effect on within-country convergence, the question of how an increase
in redistribution affects regional growth can only be answered if we are willing to assume
that there is no need to include country×year dummies such that overall effect of the
rate of redistribution on growth can be estimated. It is possible -and probably wise- to
include country dummies to control for country-specific omitted variables, as was done in
specification (III) of table 4. The importance of these omitted variables is illustrated by the
significant change in the coefficient on ρn,t−1 between columns (II) and (III) when country
dummies are included.
Table 8 shows the estimated growth rates for German regions in the year 2000 at various
relative regional income positions in 1999 (approximately 10 percent below the average
regional income, at the average regional income, and approximately 10-percent above the
average regional income) and at three different rates of redistribution (the observed 1999
rate of 0.4323, and a rate 10 percentage points below and above this level).18 Note that at
18Take a region with a 1999 regional per capita income 10 percent below the country average, and a
hypothetical rate of redistribution of 0.33 (0.1 below the observed rate of 0.43). The region is predicted to
grow at a yearly growth rate of 0.35657 + 0.018459 + (-0.125)(2.7131) + (-0.1)(-0.119) + (-0.1)(0.281)(0.33)
+(-0.0450)(0.33) = 0.023 annually; where 0.3914 and 0.033309 are country and year effects which are
omitted from table 4.
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yni1995 = 2.61 yni1995 = 2.71 yni1995 = 2.81
ρn1995 = 0.33 0.0236 0.0211 0.0185
ρn1995 = 0.43 0.0163 0.0165 0.0168
ρn1995 = 0.53 0.0089 0.0120 0.0151
Table 8: Predicted regional growth rates for German regions, at various levels of 1999 regional
income and redistribution rates.
the observed rate of redistribution ρn1995 = 0.43 Germany regional income is predicted to
diverge slowly (but insignificantly).
Decreasing the rate of redistribution by 10 percentage points is predicted to restore
regional convergence. The decrease in ρn,t−1 is also predicted to increase growth in both
relatively backward and relatively rich regions. The growth effect of the decrease in
redistribution is smaller for richer regions. For a few relatively rich regions in Germany, the
predicted growth effect even becomes negative. This is effect is not significantly different
from 0 however for any region, however.
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